Wangari Maathai - Resources and Conflict

No tengo otra manera de editarlo pinchad en el recuadro. Conferencia de Wangari Maathai sobre la relación de los conflictos armados con los recursos materiales.
Wangari Maathai (nacida el 1 de abril de 1940 en Nyieri, Kenia) es una activista política y ecologista keniana. En 2004 recibió el Premio Nobel de la Paz por "sus contribuciones al desarrollo sostenible, a la democracia y a la paz". Es la primera mujer africana que recibe este galardón. La doctora Maathai es además miembro electo en el parlamento y ministra de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales dentro del gobierno presidido por Mwai Kibaki. (pinchad en las palabras azules y os llevará al Wikipedia, por si quereis más información)

"Failing to Empower Women Peacebuilders: A Cautionary Tale from Angola",

Donald Steinberg in PeaceWomen E-News
25 April 2007PeaceWomen E-News
In the summer of 1994, against the backdrop of the Rwandan genocide and the deterioration of conditions in Somalia, one of the few hopeful developments on the African continent came from the Zambian capital of Lusaka, where Angolans from the Government and the rebel UNITA movement and international mediators were working to end two decades of civil war that had killed a half million people. In my position as President Clinton's special assistant for African affairs, I had the privilege of supporting these negotiations, which bore fruit in November 1994 with the signing of the Lusaka Protocol.
This comprehensive peace accord promised an end to the conflict and a new era of national reconciliation and reconstruction.
Addressing an audience of African scholars on the Lusaka Protocol in late 1994, I was asked about the role of women in its negotiating and implementation. I responded that there was not a single provision in the agreement that discriminated against women. "The agreement is gender-neutral," I proclaimed, somewhat proudly.
President Clinton then named me as US ambassador to Angola and a member of the Luanda-based Joint Commission charged with implementing the peace accords. It took me only a few weeks after my arrival in Luanda to realize that a peace agreement that is "gender-neutral" is, by definition, discriminatory against women and thus far less likely to be successful. The exclusion of women and gender considerations from the peace process proved to be a key factor in our inability to implement the Lusaka Protocol and in Angola's return to conflict in late 1998.
Consider the evidence. Most telling was the failure to insist that women participate in the Joint Commission itself. As a result, at each meeting of this body, forty men sat around the table. Not a single delegation - the Angolan government, UNITA, the United Nations, Portugal, Russia or the United States - had a woman on its team. Not only did this silence women's voices on the hard issues of war and peace, but it also meant that issues as internal displacement, sexual violence, abuses by government and rebel security forces, and the rebuilding of social services such as maternal health care and girls' education were given short shrift - or no shrift at all.
Those in the Joint Commission who sought to address gender issues encountered other barriers. The peace accord was based on 13 separate amnesties that excluded the possibility of prosecution for atrocities committed during the conflict. One amnesty even excused any actions that might take place six months in the future. Given the prominence of sexual abuse and exploitation during the conflict, including rape used as a weapon of war, thse amnesties meant that men with guns forgave other men with guns for crimes committed against women. This flaw also undercut any return to a culture of rule of law and accountability, and introduced a cynicism at the heart of our efforts to rebuild and reform the justice and security sectors.
Similarly, as we launched disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs for ex-combatants, we soon realized that the agreement defined a combatant as anyone identified as such by their military's leadership. The thousands of women who had been kidnapped or coerced mostly into the rebel forces were largely excluded by their leaders, since most of them were exploited as cooks, messengers, bearers, and even sex slaves. Thus, we had to scramble to provide any support to these victims.
Male ex-combatants received a little money and demobilization kits consisting mostly of seeds and farm tools. We then shipped them back to communities where they had no clear roles, since they lacked marketable skills and the communities had learned to live without them during the decades of conflict. As elsewhere around the world, the result was a dramatic rise in alcoholism, drug abuse, divorce, and domestic violence, and the breakdown of the coping mechanisms that gave women some protection during the conflict. Thus, the end of civil war unleashed a new era of violence against women.
Even such well-intentioned efforts as clearing major roads of landmines to allow the more than 2 million refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes backfired against women. Angola was plagued by up to a million landmines planted by a dozen separate military forces throughout its conflict. But road clearance demining efforts preceded the demining of local fields, wells, and forests. So as newly resettled women went out to plant the fields, fetch water, and collect fire wood, they faced a new rash of landmine accidents.
The Lusaka Protocol was largely silent on or had inadequate mechanisms to deal with a wide variety of other issues, including trafficking in persons, reconstitution of reproductive health care systems, a displacement-related burgeoning of the HIV/AIDS rate, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in civilian hands, and psycho-social assistance to the victims of rape and other sexual violence.
Faced with these challenges, the indefatigable UN Special Representative Aliouene Blondin Beye - who later lost his life in the pursuit of peace in Angola - brought out gender advisers and human rights officers to guide our efforts. Our embassy launched programs in maternal health care, girls' education, humanitarian demining, micro-enterprise, and support for women's non-governmental organizations. Moreover, we insisted that women be involved as planners, implementers and beneficiaries for our humanitarian and reconstruction assistance programs under the guidance, "Nothing about us without us."
These efforts were greatly assisted by excellent guidance from the Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children, Widtech, and Special Envoy Paul Hare. But it was too little, too late. The peace process was already viewed as serving the interests of the warring parties rather than the general population. Thus when the peace process faltered in mid-1998 because of insufficient commitment from both the government and especially UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, there was insufficient civil society pressure on the leaders to prevent a return to conflict.
I leave it to an enterprising researcher to fully document the case, but I have no doubt that the exclusion of one-half of the population from the Angolan peace process - and from institutions of governance and the formal economy - meant that inadequate attention was paid to areas essential to consolidate peace and reconstruct the country. This contributed to the return to another three years of fighting that ended only with Savimbi's death in 2001.
The adoption in 2000 of UN Security Council resolution 1325 brought the promise of a systematic approach and concentrated energy to address these issues, but thus far, has largely been a dream deferred. Courageous and talented women trying to help build peace around the world still face discrimination in legal, cultural and traditional practices. Sexual violence and threats against women in power structures still impose a stigma of victimization that makes the most impressive women think twice before stepping forward. And yet there are more and more cases -- from Liberia to Rwanda to Nepal to Uganda -- where women are contributing to peace and reconstruction processes.
There is much to do to make such cases the norm. As a global community, we must safeguard and strengthen women peacebuilders with personal security and training. We must ensure a critical mass - beginning at 20-30 percent - of women in peace talks, reconstruction conferences, and governance mechanisms.
We must focus on rebuilding social structures with particular importance to women, such as reproductive health care and girls' education. We must end the culture of impunity that turns a blind eye toward violence against women. We must bring more women into the security forces of post-conflict countries.
Even within the UN system itself, we have a long way to go. As the world hailed the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as president of Liberia, the UN Secretary General issued a report in September 2006 identifying the benchmarks that would allow for the drawdown and withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from that country. Of 39 benchmarks on security, governance, rule of law, and economic revitalization, there was not a single mention of women or gender. Of the remaining seven benchmarks on infrastructure and basic services, only the last item mentioned the need for girls' school enrolment.
This situation is dangerous. Including women in building peace it is not just a question of fairness and equity. Peace agreements and post-conflict governance and reconstruction simply work better when women are involved and gender is taken into account. With the growth of new peace negotiations and peacekeeping mission globally, the case of Angola is a cautionary tale that we ignore at our peril.
Donald Steinberg is vice-president for multilateral affairs and head of the New York office of International Crisis Group. He formerly served as US Ambassador to Angola, NSC Senior Director for African Affairs, and Special Representative of the President for Global Humanitarian Demining.

Sucesos de Mayo III. Carta de Benito Pabón, exiliado del POUM

El tercer texto de nuestro especial del 70º Aniversario de los Sucesos de Mayo en Barcelona, no relata los hecho en sí, pero es una declaración de la persecución hacia los poumistas, antecedente y comienzo de la estrategia del PCE y la Cheka en la Guerra Civil Española.

"Es muy difícil para quien parte tan activa tomó, como me sucede, en los acontecimientos de España desde el 19 de julio, romper sin esfuerzo supremo todas las ligaduras afectivas, nacidas a través de esta actuación. Había puesto en ella tal dosis de cordialidad que hasta el momento -¡caso raro!- tenía la seguridad de no haberme creado un solo enemigo. He repetido hasta la saciedad, en todas mis conversaciones con las diferentes organizaciones antifascistas, en todas las reuniones y en todos mis discursos, que estaba firmemente convencido de que una lealtad mutua, una unidad de acción y de objetivo eran lo único que podría darnos la victoria...
Sin embargo -he aquí lo extremadamente doloroso-, el afán de hegemonía de ciertos sectores y destacadísimamente del comunista, ha hecho que donde se debió llegar a una armonía y compenetración perfectas, sólo existían odios, desavenencias y luchas sordas e intestinas que acabarán por dar al traste, ayudados por notorios errores de gobierno, con la capacidad de resistencia de nuestra retaguardia.
El hecho es que, a causa en gran parte de la ayuda real y efectiva dada por Rusia a la guerra, el partido comunista gobierna hoy como le place los destinos de la España republicana. Si no va más lejos en la destrucción de los demás grupos políticos es solamente porque, por el momento, esto no le parece deseable ni ventajoso. En efecto, todavía debe mantener ciertas apariencias, tanto en España como en el extranjero.
Y esta hegemonía del Partido Comunista supone, y los hechos de demuestran, la implantación de los métodos políticos característicos de Rusia. La desaparición y asesinato de Nin fue un síntoma alarmante y trágico. La organización comunista, con la complicidad de sectores de la Dirección general de Seguridad, burlando la buena fe del señor Zugazagoitia -tan buen periodista como detestable ministro de la Gobernación-, lo secuestró y asesinó. Y no bastándole con esto, inventó el burdo cuento, muy apropiado para niños o idiotas, de haber sido arrebatado a la policía por una organización fascista, con la que el ex-secretario de la Internacional Sindical Roja -según ellos, estaba de perfecto acuerdo. Lanzados por este camino, los secuestros se repiten y poniendo empeño en acabar con todos los que no se someten a sus propósitos, los comunistas usan no ya sólo la violencia, sino lo que aún es más repugnante: de todos los resortes que Maquiavelo pudiera soñar como empleados contra los enemigos de los dueños del poder. La vida, la libertad y la honra, el prestigio de cualquiera por muy alto que esté, no merece el menor respeto. A diestro y siniestro, falsificando si es preciso documentos e inventando historias, lanzan las excomuniones calificando de traidores o de espías a los hombres de más clara historia revolucionaria[...]
He tomado mi decisión, pero antes de alejarme de España he creído un deber dar estas explicaciones. No fue el menor motivo, en mis dudas sobre el retorno a Valencia, el afán de defender a los compañeros de ustedes, militantes del POUM, sometidos al más injusto y absurdo de los procesos. no fue la menor entre las razones que me hicieron dudar. Si estuviese convencido de que quedarme en España daría algunas garantías a vuestros camaradas, no habría dudado en quedarme, incluso contra mis propios intereses. Desgraciadamente he de confesarles que conociendo a fondo la situación, todo mi esfuerzo, es decir, todo lo que se me había de permitir, lo considero inútil y lleno de riesgos.
Recientemente, en la España antifascista se ha adoptado una teoría más abracadabrante que todas las que hubiésemos creído posibles durante el período más despótico de la monarquía. Es la teoría de que un abogado que defiende una causa puede, por esa sola razón, ser acusado de complicidad con los actos de que son acusados sus clientes. Esa ha sido, en efecto, la explicación dada para la detención y encarcelamiento de algunos abogados bien conocidos. La prensa comunista formula claramente la opinión de que, siendo yo el abogado del POUM, era por tanto un traidor, un espía y un amigo de Franco, como se acusaba de serlo a mis clientes. En semejante atmósfera, en la que las calumnias son inventadas y las falsedades establecidas de un día para otro, ¿podéis decirme que garantías podía tener de que mi papel de abogado defensor no se habría trocado en el de acusado, sin ninguna posibilidad de defenderme contra todas las calumnias que hubiesen querido descargar sobre mi cabeza?[...]
Desde aquí y desde cualquier lugar fuera de España, estoy dispuesto a ayudaros informando sobre los verdaderos hechos de este proceso. He abandonado todo, me voy completamente desilusionado. Yo descargo mi corazón ante vosotros, lleno de tristeza por haber abandonado un país en el que he trabajado con lealtad para tratar de remediar, en la medida de mis fuerzas, las injusticias de las que sufre nuestro pueblo" (Carta de Benito Pabón a la comisión ejecutiva clandestina del POUM). En La révolution prolétarienne (París, nº263, 25/1/1938) John Mac Govern